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The Institutional Custody Wars: Why a Federal Charter Beats Faster Software

· 12 min read
Dora Noda
Software Engineer

In the race to custody institutional crypto assets, there's a $109 billion question that separates winners from also-rans: Can your security architecture survive a federal audit? As the crypto custody market explodes from $5.52 billion in 2025 to a projected $109.29 billion by 2030, institutional players are discovering that regulatory compliance creates moats deeper than any technological advantage. And on September 21, 2026—less than seven months away—the rules change permanently.

The custody wars aren't just about who has the best tech. They're about who can prove exclusive control of private keys in a way that satisfies the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and NIST's Federal Information Processing Standards. The answer is reshaping the competitive landscape and forcing uncomfortable questions: Is Multi-Party Computation (MPC) enough? Or do institutions need Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)? And what does a federal bank charter buy you that billions in venture capital cannot?

The Qualified Custodian Standard: Why Software Alone Won't Cut It

When the SEC expanded its custody rule to cover digital assets, it created a bright-line test: qualified custodians must prove "exclusive control" of client assets. For crypto, that means proving exclusive control of private keys—not just claiming it, but demonstrating it through verifiable technical infrastructure.

Anchorage Digital's letter to the SEC made the case explicit: "Proof of exclusive control is definitively provable by relying on air-gapped hardware security modules (HSMs) to generate and secure custody of private keys." This isn't a suggestion—it's becoming the regulatory standard.

The distinction matters because HSMs provide physical tamper-resistant hardware that generates and stores keys in a secure enclave. FIPS 140-3 Level 3 certification requires physical security mechanisms that make extraction or modification of keys mathematically and physically prohibitive. Software-based MPC, by contrast, distributes key shares across multiple parties—elegant cryptography, but fundamentally different from the air-gapped hardware paradigm regulators understand and trust.

Here's the catch: On September 21, 2026, every existing FIPS 140-2 certificate will be archived. After that date, only FIPS 140-3 validation counts for U.S. government contracts, Canadian government work, and most regulated financial institutions. Custodians that can't demonstrate hardware-backed FIPS 140-3 Level 3 compliance will find themselves locked out of the institutional market.

The Federal Charter Moat: Anchorage's Regulatory Head Start

Anchorage Digital Bank received the first-ever OCC national trust charter for a crypto company in January 2021. Five years later, it remains the only federally chartered digital asset bank—a monopoly position that compounds its competitive advantage with every passing quarter.

What does a federal charter buy? Three things no amount of VC funding can replicate:

  1. Unambiguous Qualified Custodian Status: Federally chartered banks under OCC purview automatically meet the SEC's qualified custodian definition. Investment advisers face no interpretive risk when selecting Anchorage—the regulatory treatment is settled law.

  2. Bankruptcy Remoteness: Client assets held by a federally chartered trust bank are segregated from the custodian's balance sheet. If Anchorage were to fail, client assets are legally protected from creditor claims—a critical distinction for fiduciaries managing pension funds and endowments.

  3. FIPS-Validated HSM Infrastructure: Anchorage delivers "FIPS-validated HSM technology" as table stakes, because federal banking charters require hardware-backed key management that meets NIST standards. There's no regulatory optionality here—it's a compliance requirement.

The OCC has been selective. In February 2026, it approved several new national trust bank charters for digital asset custody—BitGo Trust Company, Bridge National Trust Bank, First National Digital Currency Bank, and Ripple National Trust Bank—but these remain a small club. The barrier to entry isn't just capital or technology; it's a multi-year regulatory gauntlet that includes operational readiness exams, capital adequacy reviews, and management vetting.

MPC's Flexibility Versus HSM's Certainty

Fireblocks, the market's leading MPC custody provider, has built a $8 billion valuation on a different architectural philosophy: distribute trust across multiple parties rather than centralizing it in hardware enclaves.

Fireblocks' MPC-CMP algorithm eliminates single points of failure by ensuring "MPC key shares are never generated or gathered during key creation, key rotation, transaction signing, or adding new users." The approach offers operational advantages: faster transaction signing, more flexible key management policies, and no need to manage physical HSM clusters.

But institutional buyers are asking harder questions. Can MPC alone satisfy the SEC's "exclusive control" standard for qualified custody? Fireblocks acknowledges the concern by offering KeyLink, a middleware layer that connects the Fireblocks platform to Thales Luna HSMs, "ensuring private keys remain within FIPS 140-3 Level 3 and Common Criteria certified hardware." This hybrid approach—MPC for operational flexibility, HSMs for regulatory compliance—reflects the market's regulatory reality.

The choice isn't purely technical. It's about what auditors, regulators, and institutional risk committees will accept:

  • HSMs provide finality: Keys are generated and stored in tamper-resistant hardware certified to a government standard. When an auditor asks, "Can you prove exclusive control?" the answer is "Yes, and here's the FIPS certificate."

  • MPC requires explanation: Distributed key shares and threshold signatures are cryptographically sound, but they require stakeholders to understand multi-party computation protocols. For risk-averse fiduciaries, that explanation is a red flag.

The result is a two-tier market. MPC works for crypto-native funds, trading desks, and DeFi protocols that prioritize operational speed. HSM-backed custody is table stakes for pension funds, insurance companies, and RIAs managing client money under SEC oversight.

The Insurance Coverage Gap: Infrastructure Versus Assets

Institutional crypto custody marketing is full of eye-popping insurance figures: $250 million at BitGo, "over $1 billion" at others. But CFOs reading the fine print discover a critical distinction: infrastructure coverage versus asset coverage.

Infrastructure coverage protects against breaches of the custodian's systems—external hacks, insider collusion, physical theft of storage media. Asset coverage protects the client's holdings—if Bitcoin goes missing, the insurance pays the client.

The gap matters because most large-denomination policies insure the custodian's infrastructure, not individual client assets. A $1 billion policy might cover a systemic breach affecting multiple clients, but individual client recovery is subject to allocation rules, deductibles, and exclusions. Key exclusions typically include:

  • Losses from authorized but mistaken transfers
  • Smart contract bugs or protocol failures
  • The custodian's own negligence in following security procedures
  • Assets held in hot wallets versus cold storage (coverage often limited to cold)

For institutions evaluating custody providers, the questions shift from "How much insurance?" to "What's actually covered?" and "What's the per-client recovery limit?" As industry analyses note, custodians with stronger compliance and security infrastructures can secure better policy terms because insurers assess lower risk.

This creates another advantage for federally chartered custodians. Banks with OCC oversight undergo continuous examination, which gives insurers confidence in risk controls. The result: better coverage terms, higher limits, and fewer exclusions. Non-bank custodians may advertise higher headline figures, but the effective coverage—what actually pays out—often favors the boring, regulated bank.

The AUM Race: Where Institutional Assets Are Landing

The crypto custody market isn't winner-take-all, but it's consolidating fast. Coinbase Custody dominates institutional market share, leveraging its public company status, regulatory relationships, and integrated trading infrastructure. Anchorage Digital serves institutions with "a custody platform built for security, regulatory compliance, and operational flexibility"—code for "we have the federal charter and FIPS-validated HSMs you need for your audit."

Fireblocks provides "institution-grade digital asset infrastructure centered on secure MPC-based custody," winning clients that prioritize transaction speed and API flexibility over federal charter status.

The competitive dynamics are clarifying:

  • Coinbase wins on ecosystem: custody, staking, trading, prime brokerage, and institutional on/off-ramps under one roof. For asset managers, the operational simplicity is worth paying for.

  • Anchorage wins on regulatory certainty: the federal charter eliminates interpretive risk for RIAs, pensions, and endowments that need unambiguous qualified custodian status.

  • Fireblocks wins on agility: MPC enables faster product iteration, more flexible policies, and better API integration for crypto-native funds and DeFi protocols.

But the September 2026 FIPS 140-3 deadline is forcing consolidation. Custodians that relied on FIPS 140-2 certificates must upgrade or integrate HSMs—expensive, time-consuming projects that favor larger players with capital and engineering resources. Smaller custody providers are being acquired or partnering with HSM infrastructure vendors to meet the new standard.

The result is a barbell market: large federally chartered banks at one end, nimble MPC providers with HSM partnerships at the other, and a shrinking middle of undercapitalized custodians that can't afford to upgrade.

What September 2026 Means for Custody Buyers

Institutional crypto buyers evaluating custody providers in 2026 face a checklist that's longer and more technical than ever:

  1. FIPS 140-3 Level 3 Certification: Does the custodian use FIPS 140-3 validated HSMs, or are they still on FIPS 140-2 (which expires September 21)?

  2. Qualified Custodian Status: If you're an SEC-registered investment adviser, does your custodian unambiguously meet the SEC's custody rule? Federally chartered banks and OCC-approved trust companies do. Others require legal interpretation.

  3. Insurance Coverage Details: What's the per-client recovery limit? What's excluded? Does coverage apply to assets in hot wallets, or only cold storage?

  4. Bankruptcy Remoteness: If the custodian fails, are your assets legally segregated from creditor claims? Federally chartered trust banks provide this by statute.

  5. Operational Flexibility: Do you need API-driven transaction signing for trading strategies? MPC-based custody excels here. If you're buy-and-hold, HSM-based custody is simpler.

For pension funds, endowments, and insurance companies—institutions that prioritize regulatory certainty over operational speed—the checklist increasingly points to federally chartered custodians with HSM-backed infrastructure. For crypto-native hedge funds, market makers, and DeFi protocols, MPC-based providers with HSM partnerships offer the best of both worlds: operational agility with regulatory compliance when needed.

The Custody Endgame: Compliance as Competitive Moat

The institutional custody wars aren't about who has the most elegant cryptography or the fastest transaction signing. They're about who can satisfy auditors, regulators, and risk committees that the money is safe and the systems meet federal standards.

Anchorage Digital's five-year head start with its OCC charter has created a moat that software alone can't bridge. Competitors can build better UX, faster APIs, and more flexible MPC protocols—but they can't replicate the unambiguous qualified custodian status that comes with a federal banking charter. That's why the OCC's recent approval of BitGo, Bridge, and Ripple trust bank charters is so consequential: it breaks Anchorage's monopoly while reinforcing the regulatory playbook.

Fireblocks and other MPC providers aren't losing; they're adapting. By integrating HSMs for regulatory-critical use cases while maintaining MPC for operational flexibility, they're building hybrid architectures that serve both institutional and crypto-native clients. But the September 2026 FIPS 140-3 deadline is the forcing function: custodians that can't demonstrate hardware-backed key security will find themselves locked out of the institutional market.

For institutions building positions in digital assets, the message is clear: custody is not a commodity, and compliance is not negotiable. The cheapest provider or the one with the best API documentation is not necessarily the right choice. The right choice is the one that can answer "yes" when your auditor asks if you've met the SEC's qualified custodian standard—and can prove it with a FIPS 140-3 Level 3 certificate.

The custody wars are far from over, but the winners are becoming visible. And in 2026, regulatory compliance is the ultimate product differentiation.


Sources:

The Lazarus Group Playbook: Inside North Korea's $6.75B All-Time Crypto Theft Operation

· 10 min read
Dora Noda
Software Engineer

When Safe{Wallet} developer "Developer1" received what appeared to be a routine request on February 4, 2025, they had no idea their Apple MacBook would become the entry point for the largest cryptocurrency heist in history. Within seventeen days, North Korea's Lazarus Group would exploit that single compromised laptop to steal $1.5 billion from Bybit—more than the entire GDP of some nations.

This wasn't an aberration. It was the culmination of a decade-long evolution that transformed a group of state-sponsored hackers into the world's most sophisticated cryptocurrency thieves, responsible for at least $6.75 billion in cumulative theft.

The Lazarus Group's $3.4 Billion Crypto Heist: A New Era of State-Sponsored Cybercrime

· 8 min read
Dora Noda
Software Engineer

The numbers are staggering: $3.4 billion stolen from cryptocurrency platforms in 2025, with a single nation-state responsible for nearly two-thirds of the haul. North Korea's Lazarus Group didn't just break records—they rewrote the rulebook on state-sponsored cybercrime, executing fewer attacks while extracting exponentially more value. As we enter 2026, the cryptocurrency industry faces an uncomfortable truth: the security paradigms of the past five years are fundamentally broken.

The $3.4 Billion Wake-Up Call

Blockchain intelligence firm Chainalysis released its annual crypto crime report in December 2025, confirming what industry insiders had feared. Total cryptocurrency theft reached $3.4 billion, with North Korean hackers claiming $2.02 billion—a 51% increase over 2024's already-record $1.34 billion. This brings the DPRK's all-time cryptocurrency theft total to approximately $6.75 billion.

What makes 2025's theft unprecedented isn't just the dollar figure. It's the efficiency. North Korean hackers achieved this record haul through 74% fewer known attacks than previous years. The Lazarus Group has evolved from a scattered threat actor into a precision instrument of financial warfare.

TRM Labs and Chainalysis both independently verified these figures, with TRM noting that crypto crime has become "more organized and professionalized" than ever before. Attacks are faster, better coordinated, and far easier to scale than in previous cycles.

The Bybit Heist: A Masterclass in Supply Chain Attacks

On February 21, 2025, the cryptocurrency world witnessed its largest single theft in history. Hackers drained approximately 401,000 ETH—worth $1.5 billion at the time—from Bybit, one of the world's largest cryptocurrency exchanges.

The attack wasn't a brute-force breach or a smart contract exploit. It was a masterful supply chain compromise. The Lazarus Group—operating under the alias "TraderTraitor" (also known as Jade Sleet and Slow Pisces)—targeted a developer at Safe{Wallet}, the popular multi-signature wallet provider. By injecting malicious code into the wallet's user interface, they bypassed traditional security layers entirely.

Within 11 days, the hackers had laundered 100% of the stolen funds. Bybit CEO Ben Zhou revealed in early March that they had lost track of nearly $300 million. The FBI officially attributed the attack to North Korea on February 26, 2025, but by then, the funds had already disappeared into mixing protocols and bridge services.

The Bybit hack alone accounted for 74% of North Korea's 2025 cryptocurrency theft and demonstrated a chilling evolution in tactics. As security firm Hacken noted, the Lazarus Group showed "clear preferences for Chinese-language money laundering services, bridge services, and mixing protocols, with a 45-day laundering cycle following major thefts."

The Lazarus Playbook: From Phishing to Deep Infiltration

North Korea's cyber operations have undergone a fundamental transformation. Gone are the days of simple phishing attacks and hot wallet compromises. The Lazarus Group has developed a multi-pronged strategy that makes detection nearly impossible.

The Wagemole Strategy

Perhaps the most insidious tactic is what researchers call "Wagemole"—embedding covert IT workers inside cryptocurrency companies worldwide. Under false identities or through front companies, these operatives gain legitimate access to corporate systems, including crypto firms, custodians, and Web3 platforms.

This approach enables hackers to bypass perimeter defenses entirely. They're not breaking in—they're already inside.

AI-Powered Exploitation

In 2025, state-sponsored groups began using artificial intelligence to supercharge every stage of their operations. AI now scans thousands of smart contracts in minutes, identifies exploitable code, and automates multi-chain attacks. What once required weeks of manual analysis now takes hours.

Coinpedia's analysis revealed that North Korean hackers have redefined crypto crime through AI integration, making their operations more scalable and harder to detect than ever before.

Executive Impersonation

The shift from pure technical exploits to human-factor attacks was a defining trend of 2025. Security firms noted that "outlier losses were overwhelmingly due to access-control failures, not to novel on-chain math." Hackers moved from poisoned frontends and multisig UI tricks to executive impersonation and key theft.

Beyond Bybit: The 2025 Hack Landscape

While Bybit dominated headlines, North Korea's operations extended far beyond a single target:

  • DMM Bitcoin (Japan): $305 million stolen, contributing to the eventual wind-down of the exchange
  • WazirX (India): $235 million drained from India's largest cryptocurrency exchange
  • Upbit (South Korea): $36 million seized through signing infrastructure exploitation in late 2025

These weren't isolated incidents—they represented a coordinated campaign targeting centralized exchanges, decentralized finance platforms, and individual wallet providers across multiple jurisdictions.

Independent tallies identified over 300 major security incidents throughout the year, highlighting systemic vulnerabilities across the entire cryptocurrency ecosystem.

The Huione Connection: Cambodia's $4 Billion Laundering Machine

On the money laundering side, U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) identified a critical node in North Korea's operations: Cambodia-based Huione Group.

FinCEN found that Huione Group laundered at least $4 billion in illicit proceeds between August 2021 and January 2025. Blockchain firm Elliptic estimates the true figure may be closer to $11 billion.

The Treasury's investigation revealed that Huione Group processed $37 million linked directly to the Lazarus Group, including $35 million from the DMM Bitcoin hack. The company worked directly with North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Pyongyang's primary foreign intelligence organization.

What made Huione particularly dangerous was its complete lack of compliance controls. None of its three business components—Huione Pay (banking), Huione Guarantee (escrow), and Huione Crypto (exchange)—had published AML/KYC policies.

The company's connections to Cambodia's ruling Hun family, including Prime Minister Hun Manet's cousin as a major shareholder, complicated international enforcement efforts until the U.S. moved to sever its access to the American financial system in May 2025.

The Regulatory Response: MiCA, PoR, and Beyond

The scale of 2025's theft has accelerated regulatory action worldwide.

Europe's MiCA Stage 2

The European Union fast-tracked "Stage 2" of the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation, now mandating quarterly audits of third-party software vendors for any exchange operating in the Eurozone. The Bybit hack's supply chain attack vector drove this specific requirement.

U.S. Proof-of-Reserves Mandates

In the United States, the focus has shifted toward mandatory, real-time Proof-of-Reserves (PoR) requirements. The theory: if exchanges must prove their assets on-chain in real-time, suspicious outflows become immediately visible.

South Korea's Digital Financial Security Act

Following the Upbit hack, South Korea's Financial Services Commission proposed the "Digital Financial Security Act" in December 2025. The Act would enforce mandated cold storage ratios, routine penetration testing, and enhanced monitoring for suspicious activities across all cryptocurrency exchanges.

What 2026 Defenses Need

The Bybit breach forced a fundamental shift in how centralized exchanges manage security. Industry leaders have identified several critical upgrades for 2026:

Multi-Party Computation (MPC) Migration

Most top-tier platforms have migrated from traditional smart-contract multi-sigs to Multi-Party Computation technology. Unlike the Safe{Wallet} setup exploited in 2025, MPC splits private keys into shards that never exist in a single location, making UI-spoofing and "Ice Phishing" techniques nearly impossible to execute.

Cold Storage Standards

Reputable custodial exchanges now implement 90-95% cold storage ratios, keeping the vast majority of user funds offline in hardware security modules. Multi-signature wallets require multiple authorized parties to approve large transactions.

Supply Chain Auditing

The key takeaway from 2025 is that security extends beyond the blockchain to the entire software stack. Exchanges must audit their vendor relationships with the same rigor they apply to their own code. The Bybit hack succeeded because of compromised third-party infrastructure, not exchange vulnerabilities.

Human Factor Defense

Continuous training regarding phishing attempts and safe password practices has become mandatory, as human error remains a primary cause of breaches. Security experts recommend periodic red and blue team exercises to identify weaknesses in security process management.

Quantum-Resistant Upgrades

Looking further ahead, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum-secured hardware are emerging as critical future defenses. The cold wallet market's projected 15.2% CAGR from 2026 to 2033 reflects institutional confidence in security evolution.

The Road Ahead

Chainalysis's closing warning in its 2025 report should resonate across the industry: "The country's record-breaking 2025 performance—achieved with 74 percent fewer known attacks—suggests we may be seeing only the most visible portion of its activities. The challenge for 2026 will be detecting and preventing these high-impact operations before DPRK-affiliated actors inflict another Bybit-scale incident."

North Korea has proven that state-sponsored hackers can outpace industry defenses when motivated by sanctions evasion and weapons funding. The $6.75 billion cumulative total represents not just stolen cryptocurrency—it represents missiles, nuclear programs, and regime survival.

For the cryptocurrency industry, 2026 must be the year of security transformation. Not incremental improvements, but fundamental rearchitecting of how assets are stored, accessed, and transferred. The Lazarus Group has shown that yesterday's best practices are today's vulnerabilities.

The stakes have never been higher.


Securing blockchain infrastructure requires constant vigilance and industry-leading security practices. BlockEden.xyz provides enterprise-grade node infrastructure with multi-layer security architecture, helping developers and businesses build on foundations designed to withstand evolving threats.

Restaking on Ethereum and EigenLayer’s “Security-as-a-Service”

· 43 min read
Dora Noda
Software Engineer

Restaking Explained: In Ethereum’s proof-of-stake model, validators normally stake ETH to secure the network and earn rewards, with the risk of slashing if they misbehave. Restaking allows this same staked ETH (or its liquid staking derivatives) to be reused to secure additional protocols or services. EigenLayer introduced restaking via smart contracts that let ETH stakers opt in to extend their security to new systems in exchange for extra yield. In practice, an Ethereum validator can register with EigenLayer and grant its contracts permission to impose additional slashing conditions specified by external protocols. If the validator performs maliciously on any opted-in service, the EigenLayer contracts can slash their staked ETH, just as Ethereum would for consensus violations. This mechanism effectively transforms Ethereum’s robust staking security into a composable “Security-as-a-Service”: developers can borrow Ethereum’s economic security to bootstrap new projects, rather than starting their own validator network from scratch. By leveraging the 31M+ ETH already securing Ethereum, EigenLayer’s restaking creates a “pooled security” marketplace where multiple services share the same trusted capital base.

EigenLayer’s Approach: EigenLayer is implemented as a set of Ethereum smart contracts that coordinate this restaking process. Validators (or ETH holders) who wish to restake either deposit their liquid staking tokens or, in the case of native stakers, redirect their withdrawal credentials to an EigenLayer-managed contract (often called an EigenPod). This ensures EigenLayer can enforce slashing by locking or burning the underlying ETH if needed. Restakers always retain ownership of their ETH (withdrawable after an exit/escrow period), but they opt-in to new slashing rules on top of Ethereum’s. In return, they become eligible for additional restaking rewards paid by the services they secure. The end result is a modular security layer: Ethereum’s validator set and stake are “rented out” to external protocols. As EigenLayer’s founder Sreeram Kannan puts it, this creates a “Verifiable Cloud” for Web3 – analogous to how AWS offers computing services, EigenLayer offers security as a service to developers. Early adoption has been strong: by mid-2024 over 4.9 million ETH (~$15B) was restaked into EigenLayer, demonstrating demand from stakers to maximize yield and from new protocols to bootstrap with minimal overhead. In summary, restaking on Ethereum repurposes existing trust (staked ETH) to secure new applications, and EigenLayer provides the infrastructure to make this process composable and permissionless.

Design Patterns of Actively Validated Services (AVSs)

What are AVSs? Actively Validated Services (AVSs) refer to any decentralized service or network that requires its own set of validators and consensus rules, but can outsource security to a restaking platform like EigenLayer. In other words, an AVS is an external protocol (outside the Ethereum L1) that hires Ethereum’s validators to perform some verification work. Examples include sidechains or rollups, data availability layers, oracle networks, bridges, shared sequencers, decentralized compute modules, and more. Each AVS defines a unique distributed validation task – for instance, an oracle might require signing price feeds, while a data availability chain (like EigenDA) requires storing and attesting to data blobs. These services run their own software and possibly their own consensus among participating operators, but rely on shared security: the economic stake backing them is provided by restaked ETH (or other assets) from Ethereum validators, rather than a native token for each new network.

Architecture and Roles: EigenLayer’s architecture cleanly separates the roles in this shared security model:

  • Restakers – ETH stakers (or LST holders) who opt in to secure AVSs. They deposit into EigenLayer contracts, extending their staked capital as collateral for multiple services. Restakers can choose which AVSs to support, directly or via delegation, and earn rewards from those services. Crucially, they bear slashing risk if any supported AVS reports misbehavior.

  • Operators – Node operators who actually run the off-chain client software for each AVS. They are analogous to miners/validators for the AVS’s network. In EigenLayer, an operator must register and be approved (initially whitelisted) to join, and can then opt in to serve specific AVSs. Restakers delegate their stake to operators (if they don’t run nodes themselves), so operators aggregate stake from potentially many restakers. Each operator is subject to the slashing conditions of whatever AVS they support, and they earn fees or rewards for their service. This creates a marketplace of operators competing on performance and trustworthiness, since AVSs will prefer competent operators and restakers will prefer those who maximize rewards without incurring slashing.

  • AVS (Actively Validated Service) – The external protocol or service itself, which typically consists of two components: (1) an off-chain binary or client that operators run to perform the service (e.g. a sidechain node software), and (2) an on-chain AVS contract deployed on Ethereum that interfaces with EigenLayer. The AVS’s Ethereum contract encodes the rules for that service’s slashing and reward distribution. For example, it might define that if two conflicting signatures are submitted (proof of equivocation by an operator), a slash of X ETH is executed on that operator’s stake. The AVS contract hooks into EigenLayer’s slashing managers to actually penalize restaked ETH when violations occur. Thus, each AVS can have custom validation logic and fault conditions, while relying on EigenLayer to enforce economic punishments using the shared stake. This design lets AVS developers innovate on new trust models (even new consensus mechanisms or cryptographic services) without reinventing a bonding/slashing token for security.

  • AVS Consumers/Users – Finally, the end-users or other protocols that consume the AVS’s output. For instance, a dApp might use an oracle AVS for price data or a rollup might post data to a data availability AVS. Consumers pay fees to the AVS (often funding the rewards restakers/operators earn) and depend on its correctness, which is assured by the economic security the AVS has leased from Ethereum.

Leveraging Shared Security: The beauty of this model is that even a brand-new service can start life with Ethereum-grade security guarantees. Instead of recruiting and incentivizing a fresh set of validators, an AVS taps into an experienced, economically bonded validator set from day one. Smaller chains or modules that would be insecure alone become secure by piggybacking on Ethereum. This pooled security significantly raises the cost to attack any single AVS – an attacker would need to acquire and stake large amounts of ETH (or other whitelisted collateral) and then risk losing it via slashing. Because many services share the same pool of restaked ETH, they effectively form a shared security umbrella: the combined economic weight of the stake deters attacks on any one of them. From a developer’s perspective, this modularizes the consensus layer – you focus on your service’s functionality while EigenLayer handles securing it with an existing validator set. AVSs can thus be very diverse. Some are general-purpose “horizontal” services that many dApps could use (e.g. a generic decentralized sequencer or an off-chain compute network), while others are “vertical” or application-specific (tailored to a niche like a particular bridge or a DeFi oracle). Early examples of AVSs on EigenLayer span data availability (e.g. EigenDA), shared sequencing for rollups (e.g. Espresso, Radius), oracle networks (e.g. eOracle), cross-chain bridges (e.g. Polymer, Hyperlane), off-chain computation (e.g. Lagrange for ZK proofs), and more. All of these leverage the same Ethereum trust base. In summary, an AVS is essentially a pluggable module that outsources trust to Ethereum: it defines what validators must do and what constitutes a slashable fault, and EigenLayer enforces those rules on a pool of ETH that is globally used to secure many such modules.

Incentive Mechanisms for Restakers, Operators, and Developers

A robust incentive design is critical to align all parties in a restaking ecosystem. EigenLayer and similar platforms create a “win-win-win” by offering new revenue to stakers and operators while lowering costs for emerging protocols. Let’s break down incentives by role:

  • Incentives for Restakers: Restakers are primarily motivated by yield. By opting into EigenLayer, an ETH staker can earn extra rewards on top of their standard Ethereum staking yield. For example, a validator with 32 ETH staked in Ethereum’s beacon chain continues earning the ~4-5% base APR, but if they restake via EigenLayer, they can simultaneously earn fees or token rewards from multiple AVSs that they help secure. This “double dipping” dramatically increases potential returns for validators. In EigenLayer’s early rollout, restakers received incentive points that converted into EIGEN token airdrops (for bootstrap); later a continuous reward mechanism (Programmatic Incentives) was launched, distributing millions of EIGEN tokens to restakers as liquidity mining. Beyond token incentives, restakers benefit from diversification of income – instead of relying solely on Ethereum block rewards, they can earn in various AVS tokens or fees. Of course, these higher rewards come with higher risk (greater slashing exposure), so rational restakers will only opt into AVSs they believe are well-managed. This creates a market-driven check: AVSs must offer attractive enough rewards to compensate for risk, or restakers will avoid them. In practice, many restakers delegate to professional operators, so they may also pay a commission to the operator out of their rewards. Even so, restakers stand to gain significantly by monetizing the otherwise idle security capacity of their staked ETH. (Notably, EigenLayer reports that over 88% of all distributed EIGEN went straight into being staked/delegated again – indicating restakers are eagerly compounding their positions.)

  • Incentives for Operators: Operators in EigenLayer are the service providers who do the heavy lifting of running nodes for each AVS. Their incentive is the fee revenue or reward share paid by those AVSs. Typically, an AVS will pay out rewards (in ETH, stablecoins, or its own token) to all validators securing it; operators receive those rewards on behalf of the stake they host, and often take a cut (like a commission) for providing infrastructure. EigenLayer allows restakers to delegate to operators, so operators compete to attract as much restaked ETH as possible – more stake delegated means more tasks they can do and more fees earned. This dynamic encourages operators to be highly reliable and specialize in AVSs they can run efficiently (to avoid getting slashed and to maximize uptime). An operator with a good reputation may secure a larger delegation and thus greater total rewards. Importantly, operators face slashing penalties for misconduct just as restakers do (since the stake they carry can be slashed), aligning their behavior with honest execution. EigenLayer’s design effectively creates an open marketplace for validator services: AVS teams can “hire” operators by offering rewards, and operators will choose AVSs that are profitable relative to risk. For instance, one operator might focus on running an oracle AVS if it has high fees, while another might run a data layer AVS that requires lots of bandwidth but pays well. Over time, we expect a free-market equilibrium where operators choose the best mix of AVSs and set an appropriate fee split with their delegators. This contrasts with traditional single-chain staking where validators have fixed duties – here, they can multitask across services to stack earnings. The incentive for operators is thus to maximize their earnings per unit of staked collateral, without overloading to the point of slashing. It’s a delicate balance that should drive professionalization and maybe even insurance or hedging solutions (operators might insure against slashing to protect their delegators, etc.).

  • Incentives for AVS Developers: Protocol developers (the teams building new AVSs or chains) arguably have the most to gain from restaking’s “security outsourcing” model. Their primary incentive is cost and time savings: they do not need to launch a new token with high inflation or persuade thousands of independent validators to secure their network from scratch. Bootstrapping a PoS network normally requires giving early validators large token rewards (diluting the supply) and can still result in weak security if the token’s market cap is low. With shared security, a new AVS can come online secured by Ethereum’s $200B+ economic security, instantly making attacks economically unviable. This is a huge draw for infrastructure projects like bridges or oracles that need strong safety guarantees. Moreover, developers can focus on their application logic and rely on EigenLayer (or Karak, etc.) for the validator set management, greatly reducing complexity. Economically, while the AVS must pay for security, it can often do so in a more sustainable way. Instead of huge inflation, it might redirect protocol fees or offer a modest native token stipend. For example, a bridge AVS could charge users fees in ETH and use those to pay restakers, achieving security without printing unbacked tokens. A recent analysis notes that eliminating the need for “highly dilutive reward mechanisms” was a key motivation behind Karak’s universal restaking design. Essentially, shared security allows “bootstrapping on a budget.” Additionally, if the AVS does have a token, it can be used more for governance or utility rather than purely for security spend. Developers are also incentivized by network effects: by plugging into a restaking hub, their service can more easily interoperate with other AVSs (shared users and operators) and gain exposure to the large community of Ethereum stakers. The flip side is that AVS teams must design compelling reward schemes to attract restakers and operators in the open market. This often means initially offering generous yields or token incentives to kickstart participation – much like liquidity mining in DeFi. For instance, EigenLayer itself distributed the EIGEN token widely to early stakers/operators to encourage participation. We see similar patterns with new restaking platforms (e.g. Karak’s XP campaign for future $KAR tokens). In summary, AVS developers trade off giving some rewards to Ethereum stakers in return for avoiding the dead-start problem of securing a new network. The strategic gain is faster time-to-market and higher security from day one, which can be a decisive advantage especially for critical infrastructure like cross-chain bridges or financial services that require trust.

Regulatory Risks and Governance Concerns

Regulatory Uncertainty: The novel restaking model exists in a legal gray area, raising several regulatory questions. One concern is whether offering “security-as-a-service” could be seen by regulators as an unregistered security offering or a form of high-risk investment product. For example, the distribution of the EIGEN token via a staker airdrop and ongoing rewards has drawn scrutiny about compliance with securities laws. Projects must be careful that their tokens or reward schemes don’t trigger securities definitions (e.g. Howey test in the U.S.). Additionally, restaking protocols aggregate and reallocate stakes across networks, which might be viewed as a form of pooled investment or even a bank-like activity if not properly decentralized. EigenLayer’s team acknowledges the regulatory risk, noting that changing laws could impact the feasibility of restaking and that EigenLayer “might be classified as an illegal financial activity in some regions”. This means regulators could determine that handing off slashing control to third-party services (AVSs) violates financial or consumer-protection rules, especially if retail users are involved. Another angle is sanctions/AML: restaking moves stake into contracts that then validate other chains – if one of those chains is processing illicit transactions or is sanctioned, could Ethereum validators inadvertently fall foul of compliance? This remains untested. So far, no clear regulations target restaking specifically, but the evolving stance on crypto staking (e.g. the SEC’s actions against centralized staking services) suggests that restaking may attract scrutiny as it grows. Projects like EigenLayer have taken a cautious approach – for instance, the EIGEN token was initially non-transferrable upon launch to avoid speculative trading and potential regulatory issues. Nonetheless, until frameworks are defined, restaking platforms operate with the risk that new laws or enforcement could impose constraints (such as requiring participant accreditation, disclosures, or even prohibiting certain types of cross-chain staking).

Governance and Consensus Concerns: Restaking introduces complex governance challenges both at the protocol level and for the broader Ethereum ecosystem:

  • Overloading Ethereum’s Social Consensus: A prominent worry, voiced by Vitalik Buterin, is that extended uses of Ethereum’s validator set could inadvertently drag Ethereum itself into external disputes. Vitalik’s admonition: “Dual-use of validator staked ETH, while it has some risks, is fundamentally fine, but attempting to ‘recruit’ Ethereum’s social consensus for your application’s own purposes is not.”. In plain terms, it’s acceptable if Ethereum validators also validate, say, an oracle network and get slashed individually for misbehavior there (no effect on Ethereum’s consensus). What’s dangerous is if an external protocol expects the Ethereum community or core protocol to step in to resolve some issue (for example, to fork out validators who behaved badly on the external service). EigenLayer’s design consciously tries to avoid this scenario by keeping slashable faults objective and isolated. Slashing conditions are cryptographic (e.g. double-signing proof) and do not require Ethereum governance intervention – thus any punishment is self-contained to the EigenLayer contract and doesn’t involve Ethereum altering its state or rules. In cases of subjective faults (where human judgment is needed, say for an oracle pricing dispute), EigenLayer plans to use its own governance (e.g. an EIGEN token vote or a council) rather than burden Ethereum’s social layer. This separation is critical to maintain Ethereum’s neutrality. However, as restaking grows, there is a systemic risk that if a major incident occurred (such as a bug causing mass slashing of a huge portion of validators), the Ethereum community might be pressured to respond (for instance, by reversing slashes). That would entangle Ethereum in the fate of external AVSs – exactly what Vitalik warns against. The social consensus risk is thus mostly about extreme “black swan” cases, but it underscores the importance of keeping Ethereum’s core minimal and uninvolved in restaking governance.

  • Slashing Cascades and Ethereum Security: Relatedly, there is concern that slashing events in restaking could cascade and compromise Ethereum. If a very popular AVS (with many validators) suffered a catastrophic failure leading to mass slashing, thousands of ETH validators might lose stake or get forced out. In a worst-case scenario, if enough stake is slashed, Ethereum’s own validator set could shrink or centralize rapidly. For example, imagine a top EigenLayer operator running 10% of all validators is slashed on an AVS – those validators could go offline after losing funds, reducing Ethereum’s security. Chorus One (a staking service) analyzed EigenLayer and noted this cascade risk is exacerbated if the restaking market leads to only a few large operators dominating. The good news is that historically, slashing on Ethereum is rare and usually small-scale. EigenLayer also initially limited the amount of stake and disabled slashing while the system was new. By April 2025, EigenLayer enabled slashing on mainnet with careful monitoring. To further mitigate unintended slashes (e.g. due to bugs), EigenLayer introduced “slashing veto committees” – essentially a multi-sig of experts who can override a slashing if it appears to be a mistake or an attack on the protocol. This is a temporary centralizing measure, but it addresses the risk of a flawed AVS smart contract wreaking havoc. In time, such committees could be replaced by more decentralized governance or fail-safes.

  • Centralization of Restaking and Governance: A key governance concern is who controls the restaking protocol and its parameters. In EigenLayer’s early stages, upgrades and critical decisions were controlled by a multisig of the team and close community (e.g. a 9-of-13 multisig). This is practical for rapid development safety, but it’s a centralization risk – those key holders could collude or be compromised to maliciously change rules (for instance, to steal staked funds). Recognizing this, EigenLayer established a more formal EigenGov framework in late 2024, introducing a Protocol Council of experts and a community governance process for changes. The council now controls upgrades via a 3-of-5 multisig, with community oversight. Over time, the intent is to evolve to token-holder governance or a fully decentralized model. Still, in any restaking system, governance decisions (like which new collateral to support, what AVS to “bless” with official status, how slashing disputes are resolved) carry high stakes. There’s a potential conflict of interest: large staking providers (like Lido or exchanges) could influence governance to favor their operators or assets. Indeed, competition is emerging – e.g. Lido’s founders backing Symbiotic, a multi-asset restaking platform – and one can imagine governance wars if, say, a proposal arises to ban a certain AVS that is seen as risky. The restaking layer itself needs robust governance to manage such issues transparently.

  • Validator Centralization: On the operational side, there is concern that AVSs will preferentially choose big operators, causing centralization in who actually validates most of the restaked services. If, for efficiency, many AVS teams all select a handful of professional validators (e.g. major staking companies) to service them, those entities gain outsized power and share of rewards. They could then undercut others by offering better terms (thanks to economies of scale), potentially snowballing into an oligopoly. This mirrors concerns in vanilla Ethereum staking (e.g. Lido’s dominance). Restaking could amplify it since operators that run multiple AVSs have more revenue streams. This is as much an economic concern as a governance one – it might require community-imposed limits or incentives to encourage decentralization (for instance, EigenLayer could cap how much stake one operator can control, or AVSs could be required to distribute their assignments). Without checks, the “rich get richer” dynamic could lead to a few node operators effectively controlling large swathes of the Ethereum validator set across many services, which is unhealthy for decentralization. The community is actively discussing such issues, and some have proposed that restaking protocols include mechanisms to favor smaller operators or enforce diversity (perhaps via the delegation strategy or through social coordination by staker communities).

In summary, while restaking unlocks tremendous innovation, it also introduces new vectors of risk. Regulators are eyeing whether this represents unregulated yield products or poses systemic dangers. Ethereum’s leadership stresses the importance of not entangling base-layer governance in these new uses. The EigenLayer community and others have responded with careful design (objective slashing only, two-tier tokens for different fault types, vetting AVSs, etc.) and interim central control to prevent accidents. Ongoing governance challenges include decentralizing control without sacrificing safety, ensuring open participation rather than concentration, and establishing clear legal frameworks. As these restaking networks mature, expect improved governance structures and possibly industry standards or regulations to emerge that address these concerns.

EigenLayer vs. Karak vs. Babylon: A Comparative Analysis

The restaking/shared-security landscape now includes several frameworks with different designs. Here we compare EigenLayer, Karak Network, and Babylon – highlighting their technical architectures, economic models, and strategic focus:

Technical Architecture & Security Base: EigenLayer is an Ethereum-native protocol (smart contracts on Ethereum L1) that leverages staked ETH (and equivalent Liquid Staking Tokens) as the security collateral. It “piggybacks” on Ethereum’s beacon chain – validators opt in via Ethereum contracts, and slashing is enforced on their ETH stake. This means EigenLayer’s security is fundamentally tied to Ethereum’s PoS and the value of ETH. In contrast, Karak positions itself as a “universal restaking layer” not tied to a single base chain. Karak launched its own L1 blockchain (with EVM compatibility) optimized for shared security services. Karak’s model is chain-agnostic and asset-agnostic: it allows restaking of many types of assets across multiple chains, not just ETH. Supported collateral reportedly includes ETH and LSTs plus other ERC-20s (stablecoins like USDC/sDAI, LP tokens, even other L1 tokens). This means Karak’s security base is a diversified basket; validation in Karak could be backed by, say, some combination of staked ETH, staked SOL (if bridged in), stablecoins, etc., depending on what the AVS (or “VaaS” in Karak’s terminology) accepts. Babylon takes a different route: it harnesses the security of Bitcoin (BTC) – the largest crypto asset – to secure other chains. Babylon is built as a Cosmos-based chain (Babylon Chain) that connects to Bitcoin and PoS chains via the IBC protocol. BTC holders lock native BTC on the Bitcoin mainnet (in a clever time-locked vault) and thereby “stake” BTC to Babylon, which then uses that as collateral to secure consumer PoS chains. Thus, Babylon’s security base is the value of Bitcoin (over $500B market cap), tapped in a trustless way (no wrapped BTC or custodians – it uses Bitcoin scripts to enforce slashing). In summary, EigenLayer relies on Ethereum’s economic security, Karak is multi-asset and multi-chain (a generic layer for any collateral), and Babylon extends Bitcoin’s proof-of-work security into PoS ecosystems.

Restaking Mechanism: In EigenLayer, restaking is opt-in via Ethereum contracts; slashing is programmatic and enforced by Ethereum consensus (honoring the EigenLayer contracts). Karak, as an independent L1, maintains its own restaking logic on its chain. Karak introduced the concept of Validation-as-a-Service (VaaS) – analogous to Eigen’s AVS – but with a universal validator marketplace across chains. Karak’s validators (operators) run its chain and any number of Distributed Secure Services (DSS), which are Karak’s equivalent of AVSs. A DSS might be a new app-specific blockchain or service that rents security from Karak’s staked asset pool. Karak’s innovation is standardizing requirements so that any chain or app (Ethereum, Solana, an L2, etc.) could plug in and use its validator network and varied collateral. Slashing in Karak would be handled by its protocol rules – since it can stake e.g. USDC, it presumably slashes a validator’s USDC if they misbehave on a service (the exact multi-asset slashing mechanics are complex and not public, but the idea is similar: each collateral can be taken away if violations are proven). Babylon’s mechanism is unique due to Bitcoin’s limitations: Bitcoin doesn’t support smart contracts to auto-slash, so Babylon uses cryptographic tricks. BTC is locked in a special output that requires a key. If a BTC-staking participant cheats (e.g. signs two conflicting blocks on a client chain), the protocol leverages an extractable one-time signature (EOTS) scheme to reveal the participant’s private key, allowing their locked BTC to be swept to a burn address. In simpler terms, misbehavior causes the BTC staker to effectively slash themselves, as the act of cheating gives away control of their deposit (which is then destroyed). Babylon’s Cosmos-based chain coordinates this process and communicates with partner chains (via IBC) to provide services like checkpointing and finality using BTC’s timestamps. In Babylon, the validators of the Babylon chain (called finality providers) are separate – they run the Babylon consensus and assist in relaying information to Bitcoin – but don’t provide economic security; the economic security comes purely from locked BTC.

Economic Model & Rewards: EigenLayer’s economic model is centered on Ethereum’s staking economy. Restakers earn AVS-specific rewards – these could be paid in ETH fees, the AVS’s own token, or other tokens depending on each AVS’s design. EigenLayer itself introduced the $EIGEN token largely for governance and to reward early participants, but AVSs are not required to use or pay in EIGEN (it’s not a gas token for them). The platform targets a free-market equilibrium where each AVS sets a reward rate to attract sufficient security. Karak appears to be launching its native token $KAR (not yet live as of early 2025) as the primary asset in its ecosystem. Karak raised $48M and was backed by major investors, implying $KAR will have value and likely be used for governance and possibly fee payments on the Karak network. However, Karak’s main promise is “no inflation” for new networks leveraging it – instead of issuing their own tokens for security, they tap into existing assets via Karak. So a new chain using Karak might pay validators in, say, its transaction fees (which could be in a stablecoin or in the chain’s native token if it has one) but would not need to continuously mint new tokens for staking rewards. Karak set up a validator marketplace where developers can post bounties/rewards for validators to restake assets and secure their service. This marketplace approach aims to make rewards more competitive and consistent rather than extremely high inflation followed by crash – theoretically reducing costs for developers and giving validators steady multi-chain income. Babylon’s economics differ as well: BTC stakers who lock their Bitcoin earn yield in the tokens of the networks they are securing. For example, if you stake BTC to help secure a Cosmos zone (one of Babylon’s client chains), you receive that zone’s staking rewards (its native staking token) as if you were a delegator there. Those partner chains benefit by getting an extra layer of security (checkpoints on Bitcoin, etc.), and in return they allocate a portion of their inflation or fees to BTC stakers via Babylon. In effect, Babylon acts as a hub where BTC holders can delegate security to many chains and get paid in many tokens. The Babylon chain itself has a token called $BABY, used to stake in Babylon’s own consensus (Babylon still needs its own PoS validators to run the chain’s infrastructure). $BABY is also likely used in governance and maybe to align incentives (for instance, finality providers stake BABY). But importantly, $BABY does not replace BTC as the source of security – it’s more for running the chain – whereas BTC is the collateral that backs the shared security service. As of May 2025, Babylon had successfully bootstrapped with over 50,000 BTC staked (~$5.5 billion) by BTC holders, making it one of the most secure Cosmos chains by capital. Those BTC stakers then earn staking rewards from multiple connected chains (e.g. Cosmos Hub’s ATOM, Osmosis’s OSMO, etc.), achieving diversified yield while holding BTC.

Strategic Focus and Use Cases: EigenLayer’s strategy has been Ethereum-centric, aiming to accelerate innovation within the Ethereum ecosystem. Its early target use cases (data availability, middleware like oracles, rollup sequencing) all enhance Ethereum or its rollups. It essentially supercharges Ethereum as a meta-layer of services, and now with its planned “multi-chain” support (added in 2025), EigenLayer will allow AVSs to run on other EVM chains or L2s while still using Ethereum’s validator set. This cross-chain verification means EigenLayer is evolving into a cross-chain security provider, but anchored in Ethereum (validators and staking still live on Ethereum for slashing). Karak positions itself as a globally extensible base layer for all kinds of applications – not just crypto infrastructure, but also real-world assets, financial markets, even government services, according to its marketing. The name “Global Base Layer for Programmable GDP” hints at an ambition to work with institutions and nation-states. Karak emphasizes integration of traditional finance and AI, suggesting it will pursue partnerships beyond the crypto-native realm. Technically, by supporting assets like stablecoins and potentially government currencies, Karak could enable, for example, a government to launch a blockchain secured by its own fiat token staked via Karak’s validators. Its support for enterprise and multiple jurisdictions is a differentiator. In essence, Karak is trying to be “restaking for everyone, on any chain, with any asset” – a broader net than EigenLayer’s Ethereum-first approach. Babylon’s focus is on bridging the Bitcoin and Cosmos (and broader PoS) ecosystems. It specifically enhances inter-chain security by providing Bitcoin’s immutability and economic weight to otherwise smaller proof-of-stake chains. One of Babylon’s killer apps is adding Bitcoin finality checkpoints to PoS chains, making it extremely hard for those chains to be attacked or reorganized without also attacking Bitcoin. Babylon thus markets itself as bringing “Bitcoin’s security to all of crypto”. Its near-term focus has been Cosmos SDK chains (which it calls Bitcoin Supercharged Networks in Phase 3), but the design is meant to be interoperable with Ethereum and rollups as well. Strategically, Babylon taps into the vast BTC holder base, giving them a yield option (BTC is otherwise a non-yielding asset) and at the same time offering chains access to the “gold standard” of crypto security (BTC + PoW). This is quite distinct from EigenLayer and Karak, which are more about leveraging PoS assets.

Table: EigenLayer vs Karak vs Babylon

FeatureEigenLayer (Ethereum)Karak Network (Universal L1)Babylon (Bitcoin–Cosmos)
Base Security AssetETH (Ethereum stake) and whitelisted LSTs.Multi-asset: ETH, LSTs, stablecoins, ERC-20s, etc.. Also cross-chain assets (Arbitrum, Mantle, etc.).BTC (native Bitcoin) locked on Bitcoin mainnet. Uses Bitcoin’s high market cap as security.
Platform ArchitectureSmart contracts on Ethereum L1. Uses Ethereum validators/clients; slashing enforced by Ethereum consensus. Now expanding to support AVSs on other chains via Ethereum proofs.Independent Layer-1 chain (“Karak L1”) with EVM. Provides a restaking framework (KNS) to launch new blockchains or services with instant validator sets. Not a rollup or L2 – a separate network bridging multiple ecosystems.Cosmos-based chain (Babylon Chain) connecting to Bitcoin via cryptographic protocols. Uses IBC to link with PoS chains. Babylon validators run a Tendermint consensus, and Bitcoin network is leveraged for timestamps & slashing logic.
Security ModelOpt-in restaking: Ethereum stakers delegate stake to EigenLayer and opt into AVS-specific slashing conditions. Slashing conditions are objective (cryptographic proofs) to avoid Ethereum social consensus issues.Universal validation: Karak validators can stake various assets and are assigned to secure Distributed Secure Services (DSS) (similar to AVSs) across many chains. Slashing and rewards handled by Karak’s chain logic; standardizes security as a service for any chain.“Remote staking” BTC: Bitcoin holders lock BTC in self-custody vaults (timelocked UTXOs) and if they misbehave on a client chain, their private key can be exposed to slash (burn) their BTC. Uses Bitcoin’s own mechanics (no token wrapping). Babylon chain coordinates this and provides checkpointing (BTC finality) to client chains.
Token & RewardsEIGEN token: Used for governance and to reward early participants (via airdrop, incentives). Restakers mainly earn in AVS fees or tokens (could be ETH, stablecoins, or AVS-native tokens). EigenLayer itself doesn’t mandate a cut for EIGEN token holders in AVS revenue (though EIGEN may have future utility in subjective validation tasks).KAR token: Not yet launched (expected in 2025). Will be main utility/governance token in Karak’s ecosystem. Karak touts no native inflation for new chains – validators earn consistent rewards by securing many services. New protocols can incentivize validators via the Karak marketplace rather than high inflation tokens. Likely KAR will be used for Karak chain security and governance decisions.BABY token: Native to Babylon Chain (for staking its validators, governance). BTC stakers do not receive BABY for their service, instead they earn yield in the tokens of the connected PoS chains they secure. (E.g. stake BTC to secure Chain X, earn Chain X’s staking rewards). This keeps BTC stakers’ exposure mostly to existing tokens. BABY’s role is to secure the Babylon hub and possibly as gas or governance in the Babylon ecosystem.
Notable Use CasesEthereum-aligned infrastructure: e.g. EigenDA (data availability for rollups), oracle networks (e.g. Tellor/eOracle), cross-chain bridges (LayerZero integrating), shared sequencers for rollups (Espresso, Radius), off-chain compute (Risc Zero, etc.). Also exploring decentralized MEV relay services and liquid restaking derivatives. Essentially, extends Ethereum’s capabilities (scaling, interoperability, DeFi middleware) by providing a decentralized trust layer.Broad focus including traditional finance integration: tokenized real-world assets, 24/7 trading markets, even government and AI applications on bespoke chains. For example, KUDA (data availability marketplace) and others are being built in Karak’s ecosystem. Could host enterprise consortia chains that use USD stablecoins as staking collateral, etc. Karak is targeting multi-chain developers who want security without being limited to Ethereum validators or ETH only. Also emphasizes interoperability and capital efficiency – e.g. using lower-opportunity-cost assets (like smaller L1 tokens) for restaking so that yields can be higher without competing with ETH’s yield.Security for Cosmos chains and beyond: e.g. using BTC to secure Cosmos Hub, Osmosis, and other zones (enhancing their security without those zones increasing inflation). Provides Bitcoin timestamp finality – any chain that opts in can have important transactions hashed onto Bitcoin for censorship-resistance and finality. Especially useful for new PoS chains that want to prevent long-range attacks or add a Bitcoin “root of trust.” Babylon effectively creates a bridge between Bitcoin and PoS networks: Bitcoin holders gain yield from PoS, and PoS chains gain BTC’s security and community. It’s complementary to restaking with ETH; for instance, a chain might use EigenLayer for ETH economic security and Babylon for BTC robustness.

Strategic Differences: EigenLayer benefits from Ethereum’s massive decentralized validator set and credibility, but it is limited to ETH-based security. It excels at serving Ethereum-oriented projects (many AVSs are Ethereum rollup or middleware projects). Karak’s strategy is to capture a larger market by being flexible in asset support and chain support – it’s not married to Ethereum and even pitches that developers can avoid being “confined exclusively to Ethereum for security”. This could attract projects in ecosystems like Arbitrum, Polygon, or even non-EVM chains that want a neutral security provider. Karak’s multi-asset approach also means it can tap into assets that have lower yields elsewhere; as co-founder Raouf Ben-Har noted, “Many assets have lower opportunity costs versus ETH… meaning [our services] have an easier path to sustainable yields.”. For example, staked ARB (Arbitrum’s token) currently has few uses; Karak could let ARB holders restake into securing new dApps, creating a win-win (yield for ARB holders, security for the dApp). This strategy, however, comes with technical complexity (managing different asset risks) and trust assumptions (bridging assets into Karak’s platform safely). Babylon’s strategy is distinct by focusing on Bitcoin – it is leveraging the largest crypto asset by market cap, which also has a very different community and use profile (long-term holders). Babylon basically unlocked a new staking source that was previously untapped: $1.2 trillion of BTC that could not natively stake. By doing so, it addresses a huge security pool and targets chains that value Bitcoin’s assurances. It also appeals to Bitcoin holders by giving them a way to earn yield without giving up custody of BTC. One might say Babylon is almost the inverse of EigenLayer: instead of extending Ethereum’s security outward, it is importing Bitcoin’s security into PoS networks. Strategically, it could unify the historically separate Bitcoin and DeFi worlds.

Each of these frameworks has trade-offs. EigenLayer currently enjoys a first-mover advantage in Ethereum restaking and a large TVL (~$20B restaked by late 2024), plus deeply integrated Ethereum community support. Karak is newer (mainnet launched April 2024) and aims to grow by covering niches EigenLayer doesn’t (non-ETH collateral, non-Ethereum chains). Babylon operates in the Cosmos arena and taps Bitcoin – it doesn’t compete with EigenLayer for ETH stakers, but rather offers an orthogonal service (some projects might use both). We are seeing a convergence where multiple restaking layers could even interoperate: e.g. an Ethereum L2 could use EigenLayer for ETH-based security and also accept BTC security via Babylon – demonstrating that these models are not mutually exclusive but part of a broader “shared security market”.

Recent Developments and Ecosystem Updates (2024–2025)

EigenLayer’s Progress: Since its inception in 2021, EigenLayer has rapidly evolved from concept to a live network. It launched on Ethereum mainnet in stages – Stage 1 in mid-2023 enabled basic restaking, and by April 2024 the full EigenLayer protocol (with support for operators and initial AVSs) was deployed. The ecosystem growth has been substantial: as of early 2025 EigenLayer reports 29 AVSs live on mainnet (and 130+ in development) ranging from data layers to oracles. Over 200 operators and tens of thousands of restakers are participating, contributing to a restaked TVL that reached ~$20 billion by late 2024. A major milestone was the introduction of slashing and reward enforcement on mainnet in April 2025, marking the final step of EigenLayer’s security model coming into effect. This means AVSs can now truly penalize misbehavior and pay out rewards trustlessly, moving past the “trial phase” where these were turned off. Alongside this, EigenLayer implemented a series of upgrades: for example, the MOOCOW upgrade (July 2025) improved validator efficiency by allowing easier restake withdrawals and consolidation (leveraging Ethereum’s Pectra fork). Perhaps the most significant new feature is Multi-Chain Verification, launched in July 2025, which enables AVSs to operate across multiple chains (including L2s) while still using Ethereum-based security. This was demonstrated on Base Sepolia testnet and will roll out to mainnet, effectively turning EigenLayer into a cross-chain security provider (not just for Ethereum L1 apps). It addresses a prior limitation that EigenLayer AVSs had to post all data on Ethereum; now an AVS can run on, say, an Optimistic Rollup or another L1, and EigenLayer will verify proofs (using Merkle roots) back on Ethereum to slash or reward as needed. This greatly expands EigenLayer’s reach and performance (AVSs can run where it’s cheaper while keeping Ethereum security). In terms of community and governance, EigenLayer rolled out EigenGov in late 2024 – a council and ELIP (EigenLayer Improvement Proposal) framework to decentralize decision-making. The Protocol Council (5 members) now oversees critical changes with community input. Additionally, EigenLayer has been conscious of concerns raised by Ethereum’s core community. In response to Vitalik’s warnings, the team has published materials explaining how they avoid overloading Ethereum’s consensus, for instance by using the EIGEN token for any “subjective” services and leaving ETH restaking for purely objective slashing cases. This two-tier approach (ETH for clear-cut faults, EIGEN for more subjective or governance-led decisions) is still being refined, but shows EigenLayer’s commitment to aligning with Ethereum’s ethos.

On the ecosystem side, EigenLayer’s emergence has inspired a wave of innovation and discussion. By mid-2024, analysts noted restaking had become “a leading narrative within the Ethereum community”. Many DeFi and infrastructure projects started plotting how to leverage EigenLayer for security or additional yield. At the same time, community members are debating risk management: for example, Chorus One’s detailed risk report (April 2024) brought attention to operator centralization and cascade slashing risks, prompting further research and possibly features like stake distribution monitoring. The EIGEN token distribution was also a hot topic – in Q4 2024 EigenLayer conducted a “stake drop” where active Ethereum users and early EigenLayer participants received EIGEN, but it was non-transferrable initially. Some community members were unhappy with aspects of the drop (e.g. large portions allocated to VCs, and some DeFi protocols that integrated EigenLayer not being directly rewarded). This feedback has led the team to emphasize more community-centric incentives moving forward, and indeed the Programmatic Incentives introduced aim to continuously reward those actually restaking and operating. By 2025, EigenLayer is one of the fastest-growing developer ecosystems – even recognized in an Electric Capital report – and has secured major partnerships (e.g. with LayerZero, ConsenSys, Risc0) to drive adoption of AVSs. Overall, EigenLayer’s trajectory in 2024–2025 shows a maturing platform addressing early concerns and expanding functionality, solidifying its position as the pioneer of Ethereum restaking.

Karak and Other Competitors: Karak Network stepped into the spotlight with its mainnet launch in April 2024 and quickly positioned itself as a notable EigenLayer rival on Ethereum and beyond. Backed by large investors and even certain Ethereum stakeholders (Coinbase Ventures, among others), Karak’s promise of “restaking for everyone, on any chain, with any asset” garnered attention. In late 2024, Karak upgraded to a V2 mainnet with enhanced features for universal security, completing migrations across Arbitrum and Ethereum by November 2024. This indicates Karak expanded support for more assets and possibly improved its smart contracts or consensus. By early 2025, Karak had grown its user base via an XP incentive program (encouraging testnet participation, staking, etc., with the hope of a future $KAR airdrop). Community discussions around Karak often compare it to EigenLayer: Bankless noted in May 2024 that while Karak’s total value staked was still “nowhere near the size of EigenLayer,” it had seen rapid growth (4x in a month) possibly due to users seeking higher rewards or diversifying away from EigenLayer. Karak’s appeal lies in supporting assets like Pendle yield tokens, Arbitrum’s ARB, Mantle’s token, etc., which broadens the restaking market. As of 2025, Karak is likely focusing on onboarding more “Validation-as-a-Service” clients and possibly preparing the launch of its KAR token (its documentation suggests following official channels for token updates). The competition between EigenLayer and Karak remains friendly but significant – both aim to attract stakers and projects. If EigenLayer holds the ETH maximalist segment, Karak is appealing to multi-chain users and those with non-ETH assets looking for yield. We can expect Karak to announce partnerships in the coming year, perhaps with Layer2 networks or even institutional players given its “institutional-grade” branding. The restaking market is thus not a monopoly; rather, multiple platforms are finding niches, which could lead to a fragmented but rich ecosystem of shared security providers.

Babylon’s Launch and the BTC Staking Frontier: Babylon completed a major milestone in 2025 by activating its core functionality – Bitcoin staking for shared security. After a Phase-1 testnet and gradual rollout, Babylon’s Phase-2 mainnet went live in April 2025, and by May 2025 it reported over 50k BTC staked in the protocol. This is a remarkable achievement, effectively plugging in ~$5B of Bitcoin into the interchain security market. Babylon’s early adopter chains (the first “Bitcoin Supercharged Networks”) include several Cosmos-based chains that integrated Babylon’s light client and started relying on BTC checkpoint finality. The Babylon Genesis chain itself launched on April 10, 2025, secured by the new $BABY token staking, and one day later (April 11) the trustless BTC staking was piloted with an initial 1000 BTC cap. By April 24, 2025, BTC staking opened permissionlessly to all, and the cap was lifted. The smooth operation for the first weeks led the team to declare Bitcoin staking “successfully bootstrapped,” calling Babylon Genesis now “among the most secure L1s in the world in terms of staking market cap.”. With Phase-2 complete, Phase-3 aims to onboard many external networks as clients, turning them into BSNs (Bitcoin Supercharged Networks). This will involve interoperability modules so that Ethereum, its rollups, and any Cosmos chain can all use Babylon to draw security from BTC. The Babylon community – comprising Bitcoin holders, Cosmos devs, and others – has been actively discussing governance of the $BABY token (ensuring the Babylon chain remains neutral and reliable for all connected chains) and the economics (for instance, balancing BTC staking rewards among many consumer chains so that it’s attractive to BTC holders without over-subsidizing). One interesting development is Babylon’s support for things like Nexus Mutual cover (as per a May 2025 post) to offer insurance on BTC staking slashing, which could further entice participants. This shows the ecosystem maturing around risk management for this new paradigm.

Community and Cross-Project Discussions: As of 2025, a broader conversation is taking place about the future of shared security in crypto. Ethereum’s community largely welcomes EigenLayer but remains cautious; Vitalik’s blog post (May 2023) set the tone for careful delineation of what is acceptable. EigenLayer regularly engages the community via its forum, addressing questions like “Is EigenLayer overloading Ethereum’s consensus?” (short answer: they argue it is not, due to design safeguards). In the Cosmos community, Babylon sparked excitement as it potentially solves long-standing security issues (e.g. small zones suffering 51% attacks) without requiring them to join a shared-security hub like Polkadot or Cosmos Hub’s ICS. There is also interesting convergence: some Cosmos folks ask if Ethereum staking could ever power Cosmos chains (which is more EigenLayer’s domain), while Ethereum folks wonder if Bitcoin staking could secure Ethereum rollups (Babylon’s concept). We are seeing early signs of cross-pollination: for instance, ideas of using EigenLayer to restake ETH onto non-Ethereum chains (Symbiotic and Karak are steps in that direction) and using Babylon’s BTC staking as an option for Ethereum L2s. Even Solana has a restaking project (Solayer) that launched a soft test and hit caps quickly, showing the interest spans multiple ecosystems.

Governance developments across these projects include increasing community representation. EigenLayer’s council includes external community members now, and it has funded grants (via the Eigen Foundation) to Ethereum core devs, signaling goodwill back to Ethereum’s core. Karak’s governance is likely to revolve around the KAR token – currently, they run an off-chain XP system, but one can expect a more formal DAO once KAR is liquid. Babylon’s governance will be crucial as it coordinates between Bitcoin (which has no formal governance) and Cosmos chains (which have on-chain governance). It set up a Babylon Foundation and community forum to discuss parameters like unbonding periods for BTC, which require careful alignment with Bitcoin’s constraints.

In summary, by mid-2025 the restaking and shared security market has gone from theory to practice. EigenLayer is fully operational with real services and slashing, proving out the model on Ethereum. Karak has introduced a compelling multi-chain variant, broadening the design space and targeting new assets. Babylon has demonstrated that even Bitcoin can join the shared security party via clever cryptography, addressing a completely different segment of the market. The ecosystem is vibrant: new competitors (e.g. Symbiotic on Ethereum, Solayer on Solana, BounceBit using custodial BTC) are emerging, each experimenting with different trade-offs (Symbiotic aligning with Lido to use stETH and any ERC-20, BounceBit taking a regulated approach with wrapped BTC, etc.). This competitive landscape is driving rapid innovation – and importantly, discussion about standards and safety. Community forums and research groups are actively debating questions like: Should there be limits on restaked stake per operator? How to best implement cross-chain slashing proofs? Could restaking unintentionally increase systemic correlation between chains? All of these are being studied. The governance models are also evolving – EigenLayer’s move to a semi-decentralized council is one example of balancing agility and security in governance.

Looking ahead, the restaking paradigm is poised to become a foundation of Web3 infrastructure, much like how cloud services became essential in Web2. By commoditizing security, it enables smaller projects to launch with confidence and larger projects to optimize their capital use. The developments through 2025 show a promising yet cautious trajectory: the technology works and is scaling, but all players are mindful of risks. With Ethereum’s core devs, Cosmos builders, and even Bitcoiners now involved in shared security initiatives, it’s clear this market will only grow. We can expect closer collaboration across ecosystems (perhaps joint security pools or standardized slashing proofs) and, inevitably, regulatory clarity as regulators catch up to these multi-chain, multi-asset constructs. In the meantime, researchers and developers have a trove of new data from EigenLayer, Karak, Babylon, and others to analyze and improve upon, ensuring that the “restaking revolution” continues in a safe and sustainable manner.

Sources:

  1. EigenLayer documentation and whitepaper – definition of restaking and AVS
  2. Coinbase Cloud blog (May 2024) – EigenLayer overview, roles of restakers/operators/AVSs
  3. Blockworks News (April 2024) – Karak founders on “universal restaking” vs EigenLayer
  4. Ditto research (2023) – Comparison of EigenLayer, Symbiotic, Karak asset support
  5. Messari Research (Apr 2024) – “Babylon: Bitcoin Shared Security”, BTC staking mechanism
  6. HashKey Research (Jul 2024) – Babylon vs EigenLayer restaking yields
  7. EigenLayer Forum (Dec 2024) – Discussion of Vitalik’s “Don’t overload Ethereum’s consensus” and EigenLayer’s approach
  8. Blockworks News (Apr 2024) – Chorus One report on EigenLayer risks (slashing cascade, centralization)
  9. Kairos Research (Oct 2023) – EigenLayer AVS overview and regulatory risk note
  10. EigenCloud Blog (Jan 2025) – “2024 Year in Review” (EigenLayer stats, governance updates)
  11. Blockworks News (Apr 2024) – Karak launch coverage and asset support
  12. Babylon Labs Blog (May 2025) – “Phase-2 launch round-up” (Bitcoin staking live, 50k BTC staked)
  13. Bankless (May 2024) – “The Restaking Competition” (EigenLayer vs Karak vs others)
  14. Vitalik Buterin, “Don’t Overload Ethereum’s Consensus”, May 2023 – Guidance on validator reuse vs social consensus
  15. Coinbase Developer Guide (Apr 2024) – Technical details on EigenLayer operation (EigenPods, delegation, AVS structure).

BlockEden.xyz High-Availability Delegated Blockchain Node Infrastructure

· 4 min read
Dora Noda
Software Engineer

Node operation made easy with a reliable infrastructure

BlockEden.xyz introduces an advanced blockchain node infrastructure, enhancing the reliability and performance of blockchain operations. This development empowers customers to manage blockchain nodes easily and efficiently, ensuring the high availability and robustness of their blockchain applications.

Blockchain node operation often encounters issues like network instability, uptime monitoring, complex setup processes, and high maintenance costs. These challenges pose significant hurdles for businesses and individuals seeking to leverage blockchain technology.

BlockEden.xyz's delegated staking infrastructure offers a state-of-the-art solution to these challenges. This high-availability blockchain node infrastructure simplifies node setup, reduces operational costs, and ensures stable and consistent network performance. This makes blockchain technology more accessible and practical for a broader range of users.

BlockEden.xyz has an impressive track record, starting with Aptos and maintaining 99.9% uptime since its mainnet launch. Our services have expanded to include Sui, Solana, and 12 EVM blockchains, demonstrating our adaptability and commitment to staying at the forefront of the industry. With over $45 million worth of tokens staked with us, our clients trust us to provide reliable and secure solutions for their web3 and blockchain needs.

What is BlockEden.xyz’s Offering of the Delegated Staking Infra?

  1. Integrating with new networks.
  2. Managed/delegated services to run blockchain nodes, including maintaining a service-level agreement, status monitoring, active on-call, and failover.
  3. Develop tools to improve efficiency, e.g., distributing rewards.

Internal FAQs

What are the OKRs for Delegated Staking Infra Trying to Achieve?

Goals:

  • Build a reliable, safe, extensible, and cost-efficient delegated staking infrastructure to sustainably generate revenue streams for BlockEden.xyz.
    • Reliable: the delegate node should have high availability.
    • Safe: the funds delegated to us should be safe.
    • Extensible: the infra should be reusable to expand to another blockchain network.
    • Cost-efficient: the infra machine cost should be covered by the delegate revenue.
ItemsKey Results
SLO server uptime99.9%
New network onboarding time<= 2 weeks for EVM chains

Why is Delegated Staking Infra Important to BlockEden.xyz?

  • It’s the revenue-generating program, bringing resources to do more strategic infra work.
  • It’s an essential infra component to serve chain RPCs, particularly for latency-sensitive use cases.

How Can Delegated Staking Infra Fail? Would it Cause Customer Dislikes?

  • Failures in delegated staking infrastructure primarily occur due to service disruptions and server downtime. These issues can prevent customers from staking tokens or lead to reduced rewards due to slashing penalties. Such disruptions often result in customer dissatisfaction due to unmet expectations of consistent earnings and reliable service.

What are the Dependencies?

  • Network Selection: The chosen blockchain network plays a critical role. Different networks may have varying protocols, reward structures, and security requirements.
  • Initial Funding: To participate as a validator in the staking process, an initial investment or fund is required. This amount varies depending on the network's criteria and serves as your stake in the network.

What are the Risks?

  • Fund Safety: Ideally, we should make a product that doesn’t bear the liability for the customer's fund. However, it largely depends on the blockchain's features, e.g., isolation of token owner and node operator permission.
  • Crypto Market Volatility: In a sudden crypto price crash or bearish market, the token rewards might be short to cover the machine cost. A liquidation plan should be in place to ensure funds are secured to operate the infra.

How to Use this Staking Infra?

  • BlockEden.xyz offers comprehensive documentation for getting started with our staking infrastructure, including step-by-step guides for both manual staking processes

Why does staking infra matter to me?

  • Ease of Access: You can easily participate in staking and enjoy its benefits without needing deep technical knowledge or extensive resources.
  • Flexibility for Future Growth: We provide the capability for future technical integrations with your needs, ensuring that as your staking needs evolve, our infrastructure can accommodate them.

How to use this staking infra?

  • To get started with our staking infrastructure, BlockEden.xyz offers comprehensive documentation. This includes step-by-step guides for both manual staking processes and technical integrations.
  • We're committed to supporting your journey, addressing concerns and fulfilling requirements as they arise, ensuring a smooth and effective staking experience.

How do I know if this staking infra is the right solution to my problem?

  • To assess if our staking infrastructure suits your requirements, we recommend a phased approach. Start by trialing our service with selected networks. Monitor performance and stability over a set period. Based on this experience and the proven results obtained, you can then evaluate the effectiveness of our solution. This data-driven approach allows for informed decision-making and helps forecast potential future revenues, ensuring alignment with your business objectives.